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The collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe in 1989 coincides with 
the end of the partition of Europe, as well as that of Germany. Symbolically, 
these events are identified with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which reveals the 
close tie between the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and German 
unification. The events of 1989 and the unification of Germany has permitted 
the reappearance in new terms of the German Question in Central Europe.
The period since 1989 has seen the return of Germany to the center of 
Europe. Federal Germany has become for its Central European neighbors 
something that it had never been : a model of democracy (all the more attractive 
as this democracy had been built on the mins of a totalitarian system1). For the 
first time in its history, Germany seems to be able to reconcile its geography 
with its political orientation2 and has revealed itself as an element of 
stabilization and integration at the heart of the continent. Its economic success 
is an example to all. Its geographic proximity and the existence of cultural links 
makes Germany the most familiar among the Western models. Its economic 
power within the European Union (EU) is another element of attraction. 
Germany for years has been perceived by Central Europe as the route to 
modernization as well as a privileged means of access to the West.
The Czech Republic (CR) has had for centuries complex relations first 
with the Germanic world and then with Germany itself. As President Havel has 
recently pointed ou t: "Our relationship to Germany and the Germans has 
always been more than merely one o f the many themes o f our diplomacy. It has 
been a part o f our destiny, even a part of our identity. Germany has been our 
inspiration as well as our pain ; a source of understandable traumas, o f many 
prejudices and misconceptions, as well as o f standards to which we turn ; some 
regard Germany as our greatest hope, others as our greatest peril."
"... [their relationship to the Czechs] may be more important to [the Germans] than 
some Germans might be prepared to admit: traditionally, this relationship has been 
one o f the tests revealing their own conception o f themselves as well. Let us recall that 
Germany's stand toward us has many times been a mirror image o f its stand toward 
Europe as a whole! At present, as newly united Germany tries to find its new identity
1 Timothy Garton Ash even affirms that "the contemporary model o f the German 
democracy is arguably the most relevant o f all... because it is a model built on the 
rubble of a totalitarian dictatorship and very deliberately designed to prevent the return 
o f (such) a dictatorship. It is, one might say; a Western system built on Central 
European experience”, in "Eastern Europe: après le déluge, nous", The New York 
Review o f Books, 16 August 1990, p.59.




























































































and a new position in Europe and the world, the significance o f the former has
particularly increased" \
As the "return to Europe" of the Czech Republic has as its final objective the 
integration of the state into the EU (and NATO), it appears today to be 
legitimate to examine the role that Germany plays in that process. In the 
perspective of the enlargement, Germany is at once seen as one of the most 
important sources of support for Central European countries as they move west 
toward the European Union. It is also the beachhead (together with Austria) of 
the Union as it reaches east.
Relations between the Czech Republic and Germany are a large subject 
and here the focus will be on the enlargement issue itself. First the different 
layers of cooperation between the Czech Republic and Germany within the 
European context (national and regional) must be examined in order to identify 
the various vehicles for rapprochement with the EU. Second this cooperation 
has a major impact on the Czech perception of the EU. The way in which the 
CR considers its integration into the EU and the way it regards its relations with 
Germany leads to an analysis of the stakes involved in integration for the CR. 
Third in the last decades, Europe has been a key word for (West-) German 
foreign policy. German support for enlargement can be seen within this 
framework. Nevertheless it seems legitimate to question the convergence 
between the German "national interest", which is the subject of so much 
discussion among academics and politicians, and the interests of the rest of 
Europe as well as Central Europe. The intention here is to examine some of the 
stakes for Germany in enlargement, as well as to attempt to determine whether 
the Czech Republic represents a specific case for Germany. Finally as the next 
enlargement of the EU will modify relationships within the region, it is 
necessary to consider the impact of the integration of the CR from a multilateral 
perspective. 3
3 Vaclav Havel, "Czechs and Germans on the Way to a Good Neighbourship", address 





























































































I - COOPERATION BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND GERMANY 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN UNION
This study will limit itself to evoking only the European aspects of German- 
Czech cooperation, even if the distinction is at times difficult between European 
relations and strictly bilateral relations. The idea here is to avoid a realist 
approach to the relations on the European level and to consider the complex 
interdependence that characterize these relations. In the case of Germany 
private actors on the economic and cultural level as well as non-state actors, the 
Lander, the euroregions and various other institutions play an essential role in 
the relations with the neighboring countries and within the European context.
At The National Level: Economical, Cultural and Political Cooperation
Cooperation between Germany and the Central Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC), and the Czech Republic in this case is usually discussed in economic 
terms. Economic integration of the CEEC is understood to be the first step in a 
full and complete integration into the EU. Other member states do not show the 
same interest in enlargement nor do they seek to develop the same type of 
economic relations with the region as does Germany, which appears today to be 
the most dynamic and enterprising partner of the CEEC, especially in economic 
terms. Eastern and Central Europe is clearly among German priorities 
concerning an enlargement now considered certain. Today Germany accounts 
for more than half of the commerce between the EU and the CEEC (all twelve 
candidates)4 5and that share has grown since 1989s. Germany has historically 
been a more dominant actor in the affairs of Central Europe than has the West. 
Oslhandel was one of the two pillars of the FRG’s influence in Eastern Europe 
during the last decades, as well as the Ostpolitik (on the political and
4 Germany was in 1995 the chief commercial partner for imports and exports between 
the member-states of the EU and the 12 CEEC (total $112 Md). 52% for Germany, 17% 
for Italy, 8% for France.
German investments in CEEC represented in 1995 19% of the total foreign investments 
(ahead of the USA and Austria, 14%). Cf Business Week, 3 February 1997, p. 14-17.
5 CEE’s share of total extra-EU trade in 1994 for Germany: exports to CEE = 10% (Italy 
= 7.83%) /  imports from CEE = 10.85% (Italy = 7%)
Germany’s share of CEE trade (% of total EU-12 exports to CEE-6): in 1989 = 42% 
(Italy = 18%) and in 1994 = 57% (Italy = 13.5%)
Source: Grabben Heather, Hughes, Kirsty, Eastward enlargement o f the European 




























































































ideological level). In 1989 the German model of a Wirtschaftswunder was one 
of the most cherished hope for all the countries of Eastern Europe.6
As for the Czechs, the EU is their main economic partner. At the heart of 
the Union, Germany holds by far the most important position with more than 
half of the economic exchanges.7 Germany is itself the main trading partner of 
the Czech Republic8 with 35.3% (in 1995), ahead of Slovakia (with 13.2%).9 
This German dominance concerns not only commercial exchange but also 
investments.10 As with trade, the direct foreign investment data reinforces the 
picture or at least raises the question of an unevenness in EU-CEE integration, 
where Germany is playing a particularly important role. This becomes even 
clearer if we consider that the other large member states like France or United 
Kingdom are playing a very much smaller one. In spite of the importance of 
these investments for the CEEC they represent only a small portion of total 
German foreign investment, about 10% as far as direct investment is concerned. 
But while this investment may seem limited, it reveals the profound and long 
term engagement of Germany with the CEEC in commerce, cooperation and 
financial aid. It represents, as does the relocation of German enterprises towards 
Central Europe, an opportunity to take advantage in the short term of lower 
operating costs in the CEEC. Investment represents above all a means of being 
present in the new and expanding markets and is in the medium and long term 
economic interest of Germany.11 The question here is not whether this situation 
is more to Germany’s or to Central Europe’s advantage. What is interesting 
about these intense economic relations besides their visibility and "social effect" 
is that they are for Germany an undeniable means of gaining direct and indirect 
influence on the development of the region and will eventually lead to the 
enunciation of new economic rules.
6 See Westerman, Frank, "Germany’s Economic Power in Europe” in Markovits, Andrei 
S., Reich, Simon (ed.), The German predicament, Memory and Power in the New 
Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997, 150-82.
7 Imports from the EU to the CR in 1997 = 531 357 Million Kc of whom 227 490 mio 
Kc for Germany.
Exports from the CR to the EU in 1997 = 430 489 mio Kc of whom 257 312 mio Kc for 
Germany. Source: German Embassy in Prague, 1998.
8 but the chief partner for Germany among the CEEC in Poland.
9 Source: German Embassy in Prague, 1998.
10 Direct investments in CR are in 1997 about 1,3 billion $, of whom 0,391 for Germany 
(= 30%). Source: German Embassy in Prague, 1998.
11 Some suggest that Central Europe could be for Germany what Mexico is for the USA. 
See for instance Rudolph, Hedwig, "German Maquiladora ? Foreign Workers in the 
Process of Regional Economic Restructuring", Innovation, The European Journal of 




























































































This preponderant role of Germany in the economic exchanges between 
the CR and the EU is the result of a general German policy towards the region 
which will be addressed later.
German Foreign Cultural Policy
The economic presence of Germany in Central Europe, more visible and more 
often discussed, is echoed by an intense cultural cooperation: "Foreign cultural 
policy is, next to the cultivation of political and economic relations, an integral 
component o f foreign policy”.12 Bonn’s cultural policy is officially part of a 
more general policy with regard to Central Europe.13 The change is startling in 
this region where Germany (West Germany) had been presented as a menace to 
these countries during four decades of communist rule; where the memory and 
the experience of German occupation during the Second World War (in 
Bohemia-Moravia, but also in Poland) are associated with the idea of direct 
German political and cultural domination and where this is perceived as a 
menace to the culture of the nation.
It is without doubt in the linguistic domain that German cultural policy is 
most active in the region14. Language instruction is perceived as a long term 
investment with positive economic and political dividends. Demand for German 
language instruction is strong in this part of Europe, even if English has made 
great progress and is today in direct competition with German. Of 
approximately 20 million people worldwide learning German, more than 13 
million of them are from Eastern Europe.15 The German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs spends more than 150 million DM in grants on the language program 
alone, which is to say a budget four times as large as, for example, France’s 
entire cultural - and not just linguistic - development program in the region.16 It 
is still too early to judge the results of this language policy17, but today more 
than 60% of the population claims a desire to learn German,18 which remains
12 "Auswartige Kulturpolitik", Almanach der Bundesregierung 1993/1994, Bonn, 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1994, 149-51.
13 See Hôfig, Carolyn, "Foreign Cultural Policy" in Markovits, Andrei S., Reich, Simon 
(ed.), The German predicament, Memory and Power in the New Europe, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1997, 183-202.
14 It is mainly through the Goethe institutes that the German language program is run.
15 Hôfig, Carolyn, 1997, p. 198.
16 Goujeon, Jacques-Pierre, Où va l'Allemagne ?, Flammarion, Paris, 1997, 271-2.
17 In 1996, there were about 737.000 students and pupils studying German in the CR. 
Source: German embassy in Prague.
18 Gabal, Ivan, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Einstellung der tschechischen Gesellschaft 




























































































the foreign language most used in the CR ahead of English.19 This aspiration 
towards and interest in German culture is directly linked to the idea that it also 
represents an initiation to German-style prosperity. From this point of view 
cultural foreign policy is seen as the third pillar of German foreign policy.
This dynamic German cultural (and not only linguistic) program is bom 
of two essential elements in today’s C R : a geographic proximity to Germany 
and Austria, since both neighbors are German speaking and represent the path 
towards the Occident; and centuries of coexistence between the German and 
Czech populations in Bohemia-Moravia. Without entering into the details of the 
relations between the Germanic world and Central Europe in the past it must be 
understood just how important those relations are in cultural terms. The 
presence of a German population created a "symbiosis"20 21among the populations 
in Central Europe that creates, even after the disappearance of the German 
population (expelled or fled at the end of the war), a better understanding and 
knowledge of each other and of their "social codes". On the other hand, the 
presence of a residual German minority (estimated at about 50,000 people) in 
the Czech Republic today plays no mediating role in this direction. Several 
reasons can be proposed to explain this, among them the fact that the German 
minority has been "czechized" during the communist decades (the new 
generation is not often fluent in German, especially when they come from a 
mixed family) or that, from the Czech point of view, they are often assimilated 
to the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft to which some of them in fact belong.
The official description of German foreign cultural policy establishes also 
the task not to be an "unilateral export o f culture..., but dialogue, exchange and 
cooperative partnership".21 Thus the policy of reconciliation held by the Czech- 
German Fund of the Future and its cultural part is within this framework.
A Political Cooperation
It is difficult to separate German-Czech bilateral relations from the CR’s 
relations with Europe given that the German policy with regard to Central 
Europe is immersed in a European context. On the political level, the European 
issue is always there between the lines.
19 Eubarometer, n° 7, March 1997, 23% of the population claims to speak German. (In 
Hungary, only 10% of the population and 13% in Poland)
20 Antje Vollmer, in a lecture at the Carolinum at the Charles University, in Prague, 5th 
October 1995.




























































































In the official framework of international accords it can be seen that 
Germany explicitly supports the integration of the CR into the EU. Thus in the 
Treaty of Good Neighborhood and Cooperation between the CSFR and the 
BRD (renewed in the same terms with the CR after partition), signed the 27th of 
February 1992, Germany undertakes to "uphold the efforts o f the CSFR in view 
of satisfying the conditions for their total integration into the European 
Community" (article 10, paragraph 2). Similarly during negotiations of the 
Association Agreements with the EC in 1991 and 1993 Germany was one of 
CEEC’s most fervent supporters (even if, as may seem paradoxical, the 
negotiations with some German partners on certain economic points were 
especially long and difficult).
Since the integration in the European Union is always named as the main 
objective of Czech foreign policy, it seems logical that this topic should be on 
the agenda of every meeting between Czech and German politicians, whether it 
is to reaffirm a common political will or to discuss a specific file. Because of 
the proximity and also the German political will to integrate its eastern 
neighbors in the EU, these meetings are more frequent than those with the 
political leaders of the other member-states. Therefore this leads to Germany to 
act as a privileged interlocutor for the Czech Republic on the European scene.22
Without exaggerating their importance, the German political 
foundations23 broadcast, for example, a German conception of European 
construction. These institutions are represented in the CR and are relatively 
active. Their goal is, for the most part, to promote democracy as well as to 
improve bilateral relations. A European dimension is clearly evident in this 
cooperative activity. Within the framework of conferences and seminars 
directed at elected officials or other actors on the Czech political scene, German 
politicians, of various political points of view (national political figures as well 
as union and local officials), are invited to come and speak to create a dialogue 
and cement relationships at all levels. It is not a matter of influence in the sense 
of imposing conditions but the simple fact of being familiar with the German 
vision which serves as a reference point for Czech political leaders, in acts of 
opposition or appropriation of these same concepts. The example of German 
political foundations is evoked here because they are a means of cooperation 
typically German which they use on a scale far beyond that of any other 
European nation.
22 We can today observe the preference given to Germany from their Czech counterparts 
in many partnership projects recently initiated by the European Commission to prepare 
the enlargement. Interview with the French Ambassador in Prague, October 1998.
23 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (CDU) / Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FDP) / Friedrich- 




























































































On another level but still in the same European context there is 
cooperation among the border regions within the framework of the PHARE 
program, for instance, which fosters contacts at the local level between various 
German and Czech actors. The program works towards a wider diffusion of the 
rules and regulations of the EU within the Czech Republic by way of Germany. 
This is the subject of the next chapter.
At The Regional Level, Direct Contact With The European Union24
Cooperation at the regional level within the European framework is in some 
respects simpler and clearer than the relations so far discussed. For the Czech 
Republic this represents a concrete contact with the European Union and allows 
for a different view of Germany and the Union in the border regions than in the 
rest of the country.
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and especially the 
opening up of the western Czechoslovakian borders has had a direct effect on 
the border regions in north, west and south Bohemia. These regions have 
become places of privileged contact with Germany. This evolution is all the 
more remarkable as the iron curtain had impeded all transborder relations for 
decades.
More than an inter-state border, the Czech-German frontier is a boundary 
between the European Union / NATO and the Central European candidates for 
integration. Since 1989 the development of the transborder activity with 
Germany in particular and the EU in general allows the border regions to 
emerge as new actors on the Czech internal scene. Today, they play a specific 
role in the Czech debate not only on Czech-German relations (which will not be 
developed here) but also on European integration.
The Czech border regions moving towards integration
The opening of the western boundaries of Czechoslovakia in 1989 allowed the 
classical phenomenon typical of border regions to appear, especially along 
Bohemia’s western border with Bavaria: the rapid reappearance of transborder 
commuting; the relocation of German plants to Bohemia and the associated 
threat of unemployment (on the German side25); the explosion of local business,
24 See Bazin, Anne, "Les régions frontalières tchèques: différenciation interne et enjeux 
européens". Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, 1999, 21 p., to be published.
25 The high salaries in Germany incite German investors to settle in the Czech republic, 




























































































but also of criminality and illegal business. The wide gap in the standard of 
living between the Czech Republic and Germany (especially Bavaria) of course 
plays a key role in the developing crossborder activity.26 27To measure the 
convulsions that this has meant for the border regions, one must keep in mind 
that these areas (especially west Bohemia) had been left underdeveloped by the 
communist regime for decades mainly for strategic and security reasons.
Today, the Czech-German border has become UE’s border. Crossborder 
cooperation between the two countries represents for the Czech economy a 
direct contact with European Union rules : export to Germany means the export 
of products to the EU, that is to say, with all the norms, laws, rules and, the 
legal framework this entails. Illegal immigration from countries, most notably 
those to the east of the CR and Poland, is above all illegal immigration into the 
EU itself.
The threat of destabilization or at least the fear of instability arriving from 
the east is often used in Germany as an argument for enlargement. In fact, one 
of the main preoccupations of Germany since the early 90’s has been to extend 
the European Union’s zone of stability to the East, so that the eastern boundaries 
of Germany would not coincide with those of the EU or NATO. Volker Ruhe, 
the German Ministry of Defense explained in a speech in May 1995 : "It is one 
of the vital interests o f Germany that the frontier between stability and 
instability, between poverty and richness, that the boundaries o f NATO and the 
EU do not coincide with the oriental frontiers of Germany. We want one day to 
see these borders as permeable as the French-German border is today".21 The 
border regions are therefore not only geographically but also politically and 
economically concerned with this approach. The development of transborder 
cooperation is seen today as an instrument of progress to this goal because it 
extends the zone of stability across the border and then further.
that in Bavaria, for instance, the opening of the boundaries has had a globally positive 
effect on the economy of that Land.
26 In the early 90’s, the difference of standard of living between Bohemia and Bavaria 
was 1 to 7.
27 Speech delivered by V. Ruhe, the German Ministry of Defense, in Bonn, at the 




























































































The Euroregions : Part of the Czech Policy Towards The European Union
Parallel to the development of informal transborder relations with Germany 
there exists a more Institutionalized’ cooperation, especially with the financial 
and political support of the European Union. The European Commission 
considers that "interregional and multi-national cooperation as a means of 
promotion political stability and economic ties is especially important for the 
success o f the pre-membership strategy." The aim of this paper is not to analyze 
the whole PHARE program but it is important to point out one portion of this 
program : the crossborder cooperation program (CRO-CO), and more especially 
the German-Czech euroregions’s part in that program. Their formation bring up 
essential questions in the debate on the European issue in the Czech Republic.
The CRO-CO Fund is the result of a resolution of the European 
Parliament, voted in 1993, which creates of a special fund for Central and 
Eastern European countries to help them to develop cross border-cooperation 
with EU countries. CROCO is financed by a part of the PHARE program. Up 
until that time, European funds dedicated to the crossborder cooperation within 
the INTERREG program could only be granted to member states.28
Five Czech-German Euroregions were created on German initiatives 
starting in 1991 : Egrensis, Nisa / NeiBe, Labe / Elbe, Krusne Hory / Erzgebirge, 
Sumava/ Bohmer Wald. They cover approximately all the Czech-German 
border, even if some Czech cities decided not to take part in the project. They 
represent for the Czech Republic a direct contact with the EU and since their 
creation have been part of the Czech European policy. Crossborder cooperation 
is in fact mentioned in the Association Agreement between the Czech Republic 
and the EU signed in 1991.
The aim of the euroregions is to promote the transborder cooperation in 
such different areas as development of infrastructure and transportation, 
protection of the environment, support for small businesses, socio-cultural 
exchanges or, more generally the amelioration of the standard of living in those 
regions. If the difficulties differ from those encountered in Western Europe in 
the past, the goal remains the same: promoting understanding, stimulating 
economic development and finally reinforcing the process of European 
integration.
28 The PHARE program for the CR is 330 million Ecu for the 1995-99 period, of this 
47% is directed to the crossborder cooperation.
The CBC program is divided as follows for the same period: with Germany: 75 millions 




























































































Even if it is obviously too early after only a few years of existence and 
application to draw any definitive conclusions, the success of the euroregions 
projects do appear to have been compromised on the Czech side and the impact 
on the populations very limited. (A comparison with Poland would shed an 
interesting light on this question but will not however be made here.29) An 
analysis of the debates on the Czech-German euroregions from within and from 
without illuminates several problems related to the issue of this paper which 
bring the German component of the European project.
Within the Czech Republic, the development of the euroregions has 
revealed the weakness of the regional structures of the country. While, at the 
local level, German interlocutors, whether from the Lander or from smaller 
communities, have real political power and enjoy financial autonomy, their 
Czech counterparts are difficult to identify and, above all, have no financial nor 
political weight. More than a simple and direct heritage of imperial and then 
communist centralism, this situation is also the result of the policies of the 
Klaus government from 1992 to 1997. The national committee of regions was 
abolished in the fall of 1990 as a symbol of one of the structures which was in 
the hands of the old communist system, and no law on a new regional structure 
had been adopted until last 1997. This especially long delay has had as first 
consequence the creation of a gap between administrative levels of the State and 
the districts. The recent law is only a first shy step, almost symbolic, in the 
sense that it does not define the prerogatives of the new regions (especially their 
finances and their power of taxation).
This brief description of a problem which could be considered as only an 
internal Czech Republic issue is more than just that. The main obstacle to the 
development of euroregions is in the logic of Czech politics which sees 
decentralization as a threat to the State in the process of democratization and 
national reconstruction. Prime minister Klaus, constantly evoking Czech 
national identity in his European speech shows (here in 1993) how this central / 
regional issue must be considered from an international perspective : "The 
hidden significance o f the euroregions is different. We must act very carefully 
and make a distinction between friendship, partnership, cooperation in 
crossborder projects and an attempt to undermine the identity o f our State... We 
want to enter Europe as the Czech Republic. I do not believe that we want enter 
Europe as the Euroregion Nisa, Labe or Sumava... Some mayors think that they 
can be in Europe sooner this way. I don't think so. I see that as a threat to the 
identity o f our State". This leads to the international (or German) as well as the 
European dimensions of the euroregions in the Czech Republic. The Czech
29 See Lepesant, Gilles, Géopolitique des frontières orientales de l'Allemagne, Paris, 




























































































reactions, on the political scene as well as within the population, are in fact an 
illustration of the wider debate: the debate on European integration, on the 
future shape of the European Union, and the evolution of relations with 
Germany within that framework.
The euroregions as seen from the rest of Europe are above all German- 
Czech; but, for the Germans, as well as for the Czechs, they are part of their 
European policy. The Czech debate on the euroregions has emerged in the 
following difficult context: German predominance within the EU (so perceived 
in Prague) and the slow and difficult road to normal bilateral relations with 
Germany. It is especially in reaction to a German (and Bavarian) conception of 
the Europe of regions’ that Klaus’s words have to be understood, a Europe 
which would dissolve the Czech state and sense of identity. The Czech debate 
on the euroregion, also shows that the German issue is at the core of Czech 
concern over Europe. It would be illusory to try to separate the two issues. This 
point will be addressed later to also show how the European issue can 
sometimes be seen as a possible and hoped for answer to the German question.
Some of the opponents of the Czech-German euroregions within the Czech 
Republic don It hesitate to claim in a provocatory manner that they are an instrument 
promoted by Germany to finance its economical development in Central Europe. The 
geographical delimitation of the euroregions is not always easy, mainly for historical 
reasons, and is directly linked to the German issue in the Czech lands. There are, for 
instance, some similarities between a map of the Czech-German euroregions today 
and a map of the Sudeten German territories before 1945. In the case of the 
euroregions Egrensis, its borders are more or less the same as the ones of the former 
historic province of the Egerland, a land which was independent until the 17th 
century and belonged to a Bavarian family.
Others prefer to justify their opposition to the financing of the euroregions by 
explaining these regions are already favored by their proximity of Germany and that 
it would make more sense to support the development of those regions located in the 
eastern part of the Czech Republic. There is no need to give more weight to these 
arguments than they deserve, but they do show how the German issue remains a 
constant in the European debate within the Czech Republic.
The questions raised by the creation of the euroregions in the CR are linked to 
a larger and more general phenomenon, that of the europeanization of relations at 
once among the member states and those between the member-states and candidate 
countries. The Czech political hesitation concerning the euroregions must to be 





























































































II - HOW THE CZECH REPUBLIC ENVISIONS ITS RELATIONS TO 
GERMANY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A Return To Europe Through Germany30 in the Beginning of the 1990s31
In order to consider how the Czech Republic envisions its relations to Germany 
within the EU, one has to look fust at what integration means for the Czechs (to 
the public as well as to political actors)32 in order to identify their expectations 
and their fears vis-à-vis the European Union. An interesting way to consider 
integration into the EU is to analyze how the process of rapprochement with the 
European Union is occurring at the same time as a separation from a difficult 
past.
One of the slogans of the 'Velvet revolution' in Czechoslovakia in the fall 
1989 was : the "return to Europe" [Zpet do Evropy], which soon became an 
official priority of Czechoslovak foreign policy. During the first stage of 
political transition, Europe (used in a positive and general sense) represented a 
consensus in terms of foreign policy. It offered at the same time a successful 
model, an aim during an uncertain period and a way to radically reject the 
previous geopolitical entity.
The new Czechoslovak politicians, of whom an important part were 
former dissidents (such as Vaclav Havel, president of the Czechoslovakian 
Republic; Jiri Dienstbier, foreign minister; Petr Pithart, Czech Prime minister) 
introduced a new policy which was in many respects influenced by the debates 
held clandestinely before 1989, particularly on the German issue and then on 
Europe as a whole. Since the division of the continent was described as being 
unnatural, it had to disappear in the short term. It is in this perspective that the 
debate was held to search for a new structure in a unified continent.33 In the
30 See the title of an article published in the Czech Daily Lidovt Noviny, 19 december 
1994, by Martin Danes: "Do Evropy Pres Nemecko" [To Europe through Germany]
31 This study will be limited by the end of the Klaus' era for sources and coherence 
reasons. The first months of the social-democrat government are not enough to allow 
relevant analyses about the way the CSSD deals with the European issue. Nevertheless 
the integration in the EU is today presented as the main objective of the Czech foreign 
policy. The political programme of the CSSD for the last legislative elections in june 
1998 was the one which followed in the closest way the current "philosophy" of the 
European integration with for instance reference to the Maastricht treaty.
32 See also Bugge, Peter, Czech Perceptions o f the Perspective o f EU Membership - 
Havel vs. Klaus, Working Paper of the Robert Schumann Centre, Florence, 1998.
33 See Schulze-Wessel, Martin, "Die Mitte liegt westwarts, Mitteleuropa in 




























































































international context of the 1980s,* 34 intellectuals in Central Europe approached 
the German issue from a global perspective.35 Germany (in fact the two 
Germanies) were at once a symbol of a divided Europe and a stake in the Cold 
war. Dissident movements like Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia considered the 
resolution of the German question as a key to getting beyond the partition of 
Europe. The reunification of Germany was seen as the prerequisite to the 
reunification of Europe itself. Since at least the 19th century the German issue 
has not been separable from the European issue and debate in the 1980s (not 
limited to Czechoslovakia but involving intellectuals from all of Central 
Europe, as well as from Western Europe, among them Central European exiles 
in the West, such as Milan Kundera) brought this to the forefront once again.
Aware of the special place of Germany in Europe, the new Czech 
politicians were convinced that it was of greater importance to develop 
privileged relations with Germany on their way to European integration. In its 
first two years the new democracy in Czechoslovakia (until the elections in 
1992 which marked a change of government with Vaclav Klaus at its head) 
tried to develop and improve relations with its German neighbor as its main 
partner and supporter for integration into European institutions. The unevoquial 
and unreserved support given by the Czechoslovak state from the very 
beginning to Germany’s unification could be seen as part of this policy, as well 
as other symbolic gestures (for instance the first presidential trip made by 
Vaclav Havel was to Germany, East and West, Berlin and Munich, symbolic 
cities for Germany as well as for all Europe).
Changes in Czech foreign policy toward the EU as well as Germany 
occurred with the change of government after the elections in June 1992. 
Vaclav Klaus became Prime minister and Josef Zieleniec replaced Dienstbier as 
the Minister of foreign affairs.
The Czech Will to Integrate The European Union
To understand Czech policy toward the European Union today and how the 
German question interacts with this process, it is necessary to bear in mind 
some of the official and non-official arguments used by the Czech government
34 after the Helsinki agreement and the appearance of dissident movements in the East as 
well as peace movements in the West.
33 especially in comparison with the end of the 70's in Czechoslovakia where a debate
among dissidents took place on the Sudeten German issue, the expulsion of the German




























































































when discussing the European integration process36, as well as the way in which 
the process is perceived in Prague. When compared with the official 
applications and especially the memoranda for membership to the EU written by 
other applicants such as Hungary or Poland, the Czech application seems to be 
more reluctant. A few points of the discussion will be briefly addressed here.
First of all, in Prague37 it is not considered necessary to justify why the 
Czech Republic is an applicant to enter the Union because it considers that it 
has always been part of Europe. The Czech Lands were excluded from the rest 
of Europe by the take-over of the communist regime in 1948, which means 
implicitly by the former Soviet Union. This idea was well enunciated by the 
Czech writer Milan Kundera in 1985, when he defined the fate of Central 
Europe as part of Europe, geographically in the center, culturally in the west 
and politically in the East: the "kidnapped Occident".38 For this "kidnapped 
west" and the Czech Lands particularly, 1989 and the fall of communism is seen 
as the opportunity to "return to Europe" after decades of totalitarism.
The sense of belonging to Western Europe is reinforced by the conviction 
of and the affirmation by the Czech people of sharing the same values (in tacit 
opposition to the East to continue Kundera’s definition of Central Europe): 
Foreign Minister Zieleniec proclaimed in an interview for Lidova Demokracie 
in 1994 that "the nations with which we feel tied and with whom we share the 
values o f civilization and a way o f life are part o f the EU and NATO. Our place 
is in those institutions".39 40
Security is another argument in favor of the integration into the western 
institutions. The fact that the European community has accomplished one of its 
main aims, maintaining peace on the continent among the member-states during 
decades, is seen a great success and attraction for Central European countries, 
newly separated from the former Soviet empire. Even the former Czech minister 
of the economy Vladimir Dlouhy considered that "the idea o f guaranteeing a 
durable peace on the continent is the basic and common stone for the European. . ,,40integration.
See Hudalla, Anneke, Der Beitritt der Tschechischen Republik zur Europaischen 
Union, eine Fallstudie zu den Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf die Finalité 
politique des europaischen Integrationsprozesses, Hamburg, LIT, 1996, 191 p.
37 again only until the end of Klaus’s era but the consequences are to be seen until today
38 Kundera Milan, "L'Occident kidnappé, ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale". Le Débat, 
(27), nov. 1983,4-22.
39 Zieleniec, Josef, interview in Lidov Demokracie, 27 April 1994.




























































































In this context, the EU is also perceived as a way to contain and even 
control Germany or, to be more "politically correct", a way to transform and put 
into perspective the geopolitical imbalance of the European scene from which 
the smaller states suffer. This appears to be one of the preoccupations of the 
small European neighbors of Germany, as J. Zieleniec explains: "/ consider the 
integration o f the Czech Republic into the EU as an historic chance. Go and see 
in Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg, all these countries also 
have a troubled past and a troubled history o f their relations with Germany. 
Those countries also consider the integration process as a chance for small 
nations."*1
Although the idea of extending the stability of the Union beyond its 
eastern borders is, often quoted in the west to support enlargement, this 
argument is not used as such by the Czech government. But the economic 
advantages of being part of the Union is for many Czechs an important pro- 
European argument even if Czech officials until recently insisted that the Czech 
economy would not need the European Union to succeed in its transition from 
communism.
This brief description of the official argument, as presented in Prague, for 
integration into the Union is the framework for debate on European integration 
in the Czech Republic. Although political relations with Europe and the process 
of integration have progressed in the recent years, these elements have remained 
a constant in the discourse on Europe and is part of what differentiates the 
Czech Republic from its Central European neighbors.
The prospect of entering the EU transforms relations between the Czech 
Republic and its neighbors in the east (see section IV) as well as in the west. 
This concerns not only the relations between the states but also their 
populations, on an economic and local level. From this point of view one has to 
focus on the "indirect" role Germany plays in the process of enlargement to the 
CR through the evolution of their bilateral relations.
The Europeanization of the Czech-German Relations
In 1989 bilateral Czech-German relations reached an entirely new context: 
democracy and the stated mutual desire for normalization. These relations have 
always been complicated and particularly so since the end of the Second World 
War and the expulsion of the Sudeten German population from Czechoslovakia. 
Even if bilateral relations could legitimately be considered by the political 41




























































































leaders of both the CR and Germany as being better than they had been in many 
years they were not actually normalized until the joint Declaration of 
Reconciliation in January 1997.
The ’German Question’ in the Czech Republic as it has reappeared since 
1989 may be defined in two ways: the gestation of a common heritage, the 
Sudeten German question in particular and the imbalance - demographic, 
geographic, economic and political - between Germany and the CR. Beyond the 
initially and essentially bilateral nature of the question, it is its implications and 
the challenges it poses for Europe are of interest here.
The German population of Czechoslovakia, established on the border 
territory (and in the main cities) since the Middle ages, represented up to a third 
of the entire population of Bohemia at the start of the First Republic of 
Czechoslovakia.42 The war, Nazi occupation and the finally expulsion of nearly 
the entire German population from Czechoslovakia in 1945-4743 profoundly 
disturbed relations between the Czechs and the Germans and the last brought no 
solution to the German question in Czechoslovakia as some had hoped it would.
The great majority of the Sudeten Germans, when they were expelled 
from Czechoslovakia, settled in Bavaria where they play a political and 
economical role of the first order. They are represented by the Sudetendeutsche 
Landsmannschaft (SL), a radical lobbying group. At the end of 1989 the SL 
presented the Czechoslovak government a list of its demands, for the most part 
already established in their constituting charter of 1950: the right of return 
(Heimatrecht) ; indemnification for damages sustained during the expulsion; 
return of goods and property confiscated by presidential decrees in 1945 as well 
as the abrogation of those decrees. The traditional support of the Sudeten 
German for the CSU of Bavaria, a partner of the CDU at the heart of the 
government of Helmut Kohl, gave them the means of applying political pressure
42 In 1921, the German population represented 23% of the Czechoslovak population 
(which is more than the Slovak population) and 33% of the population in Bohemia. Cf. 
Mamatey, Victor, Luza, Radomir (ed.), La République tchécoslovaque 1918-1938, 
Paris, Librairie du Regard, 1987, p. 40.
The term "sudeten German” first appears in the 20’s. It is first used to identify the 
Germans living in the border regions, and later all the German population living in 
Czechoslovakia.
43 The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in 1945-47 was enacted 
according to the decrees of the Czechoslovak president Edvard Benes, and then the 
Potsdam Agreements (article XIH). This expulsion is to be considered in a wider 
context: the flight and massive expulsion of the German populations living in Central 




























































































on the federal government and permitted the SL to directly affect bilateral 
relations between the German and the Czech governments.
The radicalization of this question in the early 1990’s led the 
representatives of the German Sudeten to try to give a European dimension to 
their demands44 : they have threatened to slow the process of Czech integration 
into the EU as long as the Sudeten question is not resolved,45 46as explained in 
1994 the Bavarian Minister Edmund Stoiber : "the only road to Brussels leads 
through Munich1,46. They intend to use political pressure not just on the 
Bavarian CSU and its representatives in the federal and European parliaments, 
hoping to be supported by Austria.47 Even if this menace seems to bear little 
weight in regard to the unswaying support of the German federal government 
for the integration of the CR into the EU, it has been repeated several times in 
public and has been widely broadcast by Czech media. The publicity 
surrounding the Sudeten questions, brought up by certain European 
parliamentarians - defenders of and spokesmen for the SL’s demands in 
European institutions like the European Parliament - has been perceived in the 
CR as an attack on the rather positive image the country enjoys abroad and on 
the European scene. Nevertheless, the signature in January 1997 of a 
Declaration of Reconciliation between Germany and the CR after 18 months of 
difficult negotiations has officially permitted closure of the question at least on 
political and legal levels.48 Without putting an end to the Sudeten German 
demands, this partly contributes to a certain "marginalization" of the radical 
trends of the SL in the debate.
Beyond this, a solution to the Sudeten German question also represents a 
foreign and European affairs goal, even if symbolic, for the German government 
on the eve of enlargement. After reunification, as Germany strived to develop 
good, friendly relations with its neighbors especially to the East, this problem 
was underestimated by the German government. The evolution of the Sudeten 
question embarrassed the German government (hence its will to put an end to it 
with the declaration) precisely when it had to convince its partners of its good 
will in regard to the enlargement which it supports so eagerly. This question has
44 The SL is, among other, supported by the Pan-European Movement, led by Otto von 
Habsburg.
45 See in particular the repeated talks of Franz Neubauer, spokeman of the Sudeten 
Germans.
46 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 May 1994.
47 The former Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock delivered a speech to this end 
during the Sudeten German annual meeting at the Pentecôte 1994, in Nuremberg.
Interview of the author with SL representatives in Munich in 1995 and 1997.
48 See Bazin, Anne, "Tchèques et Allemands sur la voie d'une difficile réconciliation ?", 




























































































also been linked to the indemnification of the Czech victims of nazism,49 and 
appeared to be the last stumbling block to normalization of relations with 
Central Europe. Its resolution will hopefully allow Germany to turn the page on 
the Second World war.
The imbalance of power between the CR and Germany, not only in 
economic terms but also in terms of geopolitics and demography constitutes the 
other side of the German question which is of interest here. This inequality has 
been accentuated by the reunification of Germany on the one side and the 
partition of Czechoslovakia on the other. Today Germany is by a wide margin 
the largest economic partner of the CR and its economic might is considered by 
the Czechs as a key factor in their bilateral relations.50 Without speaking of the 
Czech Republic becoming the 16th Land of Germany, the rapid development of 
the German economic presence in the CR is particularly visible since before 
1989 it had been practically nil and very discreet. In this geopolitical context, 
integration into the EU is perceived by the Czechs as a means to reduce German 
predominance in the CR by diluting it with the rest of Europe.
Towards a Triangular Relationship : the European Union as a Solution to 
the "German Problem"
Approaching the problematic of the Czech-German relations from this angle 
points out its European dimension or even its "europeanization". In fact, 
discussing the Sudeten question at the European parliament or considering the 
geopolitical imbalance in a wider framework places relations on the European 
level.
49 In fact, the CR was the last country to be indemnized by Germany for the nazi 
occupation of the country during the war.
50 See the sociological study about the border region: Houzvicka, Vaclav (ed.), Reflexe 
sudetonemecke otazky a postoje obyvalelstva ceskeho pohranici k Nemecku, [reflexions 
on the german Sudeten issue and on the attitude of the inhabitants of the Czech border 
regions towards Germany] Sociologicky Ustav Akademie Ved Cesk6 Republiky 
Vyskumny Tym Pohranici, Usti nad Labem, 1997, 94 p.
In a national survey conducted in spring 1996, nearly half of those questioned 
considered the German economy a potential menace for the CR (Study held by 
FACTUM agency in March 1996, "Image from Germany". "Does germany represent an 
economical threat for our country ?": 48,8% said yes and 43% no), or that it had a 
negative effect on the economy in the CR (poll IVVM, 2-7 february 1996, to the 
question "how do you estimate the German influence on the Czech economy ?", 48% 
answered "rather unfavourable or very unfavourable", against only 39% rather 
favourable (30%) and very favourable (9%), which is a more negative opinion than in a 





























































































The Czechs see their rapport with their German neighbor evolving into an 
increasingly "triangular" relationship: the Czech Republic, Germany and the 
European Union. The former Czech minister of Foreign Affairs, Josef Zieleniec, 
speaks of "an integrated Europe where essential events are not played out on a 
bilateral level but multilaterally... and when we say that the principle goal o f 
Czech foreign policy is integration into the EU, we see several levels, one of 
which is our relationship with our great neighbor Germany"
This evolution is a consequence of the europeanization of the relations 
between member states and non members and most especially with the 
candidate states. The prospect of integration, in effect, leads the candidate states 
to closer economic, judicial and social ties to the EU. Attempting to consider 
these relationships as strictly bilateral no longer makes sense.
The Czech population’s perceptions of European integration are an 
illustration of the "triangularization" of the Czech-German relations and the 
intermingling of concerns over Germany and Europe.51 2 The Czech population 
perceives that the role and position of Germany in Europe and in the world is 
transformed by the fact that Germany belongs to the EU and NATO. In a 
sociological survey, 56% (compared to 33% who disagreed) felt that it was 
because of German’s integration into EU and NATO, that there is no danger 
from that country. Despite the fact that the study shows that Germany is still 
considered a potential threat, this response coincides with the public opinion 
(70% for to 16% against) that integration of the Czech Republic into the 
EU/NATO is a way to improve current Czech-German relations. This same 
phenomenon is observed on the German side when Germany develops its 
foreign policy within a multilateral (and often European) framework (see 
section III). Integration into EU/NATO then is seen as a potential means of 
destroying the fear of Germany in Czech society. It is perceived (and presented) 
as one answer, or even the best answer to the German problem today.
The EU is seen as the opportunity for small countries to gain weight on 
the European scene. The idea that Denmark or the Netherlands have the same 
rights and voice as Germany constitutes an important element of attraction for 
the EU. A factor in the debate is that integration could attenuate the imbalance 
between the two states. A chance for a new balance of relations is seen by the 
smaller nation candidates of Central Europe in a very positive way, as one of 
their historic fears is, a loss of national sovereignty.53 No sooner free from the
51 Zieleniec, Josef, in Respekt, January 4th 1993.
52 "Einstellung der Tschechischen Gesellschaft zu Deutschland", Gabal, Analysis & 
Consulting, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Juli 1995.




























































































hold of the Soviet Union it is hard, despite the clear economic consequences of 
non integration, for public opinion to conceive of having to abandon 
sovereignty, even if only symbolically. More than ever and more than any other 
neighboring nation, the Czech Republic, after the breakup of Czechoslvakia is 
confronted with the problem of being an even smaller nation next to a larger 
unified Germany.
As far as the past is concerned, Germany would like to turn the page on 
World War II and establish relations with its Central European neighbors along 
new lines. On the Czech side, the Sudeten German issue embarrasses the 
government, in that it has been a latent menace to all political discussions 
between the two states. Not only does the dispute threaten to tarnish the image 
of the Czech Republic but it puts it in a more uncomfortable position vis-à-vis 
Western Europe than its Central European counterparts. Finally it is a question 
of political will on both parts to regard past points of contention and stumbling 
blocks not bilateral but from a European perspective as they pursue the process 
of integration and bring it to term.
This leads to a redefinition of problems which no longer have the same 
meaning they did in the past and which can no longer be put in the same terms. 
The words of Wolfgang Schauble, president of the CDU-CSU parliamentary 
group in the Bundestag are illustrative of this evolution : "Being a member of 
the EU also signifies a commitment to the fundamental liberties o f the people of 
Europe. Amongst them is the freedom o f movement and residence for the 
citizens of the member states, but also for Germans. Why should not the 
German people go and live and work in Silesia or in Bohemia ?"54 The Sudeten 
question thus changes the perspective and demand for a right of return that no 
longer makes sense in this new context. Even if it would be too simple to speak 
of a "solution", such an evolution nevertheless marks an important change. The 
problem is diffused and thereby relativised. Whether as referee (such as the 
European Justice Court) or as a third party, the European Union is a more and 
more necessary interlocutor, when on the bilateral level no solutions can be 
found.
Opponents of the European Union Use Germany as an Argument
Even if there exists today a consensus at the heart of the Czech political 
leadership to support European integration (extremist parties are not under 
discussion here) there are a few voices raised, notably within the former right 
wing majority, to put into question the process of integration. Below are some 
elements of the discussion tied to the German question.




























































































An advisor to the former Prime minister Vaclav Klaus, Vaclav 
Belohradsky is an intellectual with influence at the heart of the ODS even if he 
is not representative of party. His argument against a "European State" backed 
by Germany is of interest in as much as it expresses a certain current active in 
the CR today.55 Belohradsky criticizes Europe in the name of anti-Germanism. 
As an ardent opponent of the Maastricht treaty which, according to 
Belohradsky, fixes "as an objective o f the EU a progressive transformation of 
its institutions into a super-state called Europe”, he denounces the EU as being 
nothing more "than one solution to the German question: by constructing a 
homogenous European State, Germany and the other European States evade 
the problems involved in a powerful national State o f Germany within Europe." 
He goes so far as to describe the European commitment of Germany as "two 
faced German patriotism" which serves only as rhetoric to disguise the fact that 
Germany, now once again a "normal nation State", is defending its own 
national interests. Belohradsky also denounces the preeminence of Germany at 
the heart of the EU and in particular the use of the traditional centrality of 
Germany on the European continent which he presents as a threat to European 
construction, preferring to turn towards the United States and the "Atlantism 
and Americanism which is the European road which leads to modem 
democracy".
Without taking up the most critical and explicitly anti-German themes of 
his advisor and in a more politic and pragmatic register, ex-Prime minister 
Vaclav Klaus often uses references more or less implicit of Germany in his 
discourse on European construction.56 A central element in Klaus’ approach to 
Europe is the question of identity.57 58 The manner in which European 
construction currently evolves presents a threat to Czech identity in the process 
of recomposition. The Central European States found themselves dragged into 
the Soviet empire only shortly after the collapse of three other empires 
(Austrian, Ottoman and Russian) and they find themselves today confronted by 
a difficult problem, "that of finding their identity and not losing it on the road 
which leads to Europe"?* Klaus does not hesitate to stress the fact that: "We 
[the Czechs] wish to become part of [advanced Europe] as a sovereign
55 See Belohradsky, Vaclav, "Proti Statu Evropa” [Against the State-Europe], Literami 
Noviny, 51-52, 18 dec. 1996, 1-4.
56 Since the Essen summit, in Germany in 1994, Prime minister Klaus has avoided 
criticizing publicly the EU nor has let suggested that his country had any hesitations 
about a full integration in short term.
57 See here the case of the Czech-German euroregions for instance




























































































political entity, as the Czech Republic, which will neither be lost nor dissolved 
in Europe, and which has something to offer to the entity it will join"59 60.
Klaus denounces the peril of a lack of a European identity today on which 
to build a unified Europe. He then takes a clear and repeated position on the 
nature of the EU into which the CR would like to be integrated without putting 
this eventual integration into question. The ex-Prime minister thus contributes 
towards defining the CR’s position on the EU in opposition to other candidate 
states (see memoranda) in as much as he places it in the center of internal 
discussion of the EU and its future evolution a s : a federation of states, a 
confederation or a giant market place. "We share European values as our 
occidental neighbors and, just like them, we believe in the significance, the 
importance and positive influence of the process o f European integration... The 
questions which we raise rather concern the form o f European integration... I f  I 
say that we are resolved to join in a reasonable European integration, I do not 
say that we are in favor o f an absolute and unconditional unification of 
Europe. 60 Only the nation state can provide an identity as a point of reference 
to its citizens. This statement implies that current European integration rests on 
strong nation states 61 and does not coincide with the concept of a stronger 
integration such as defended by Federal Germany. The denunciation of a 
"Europe of regions”, upheld notably by Bavaria, fits this pattern as well.
On the economic level, the perception of Czech public is also revealing 
both of the "centrality" and permanence of the German issue in the European 
debate and of the ambiguity in their expectations, in regard to Germany. When 
considering Germany’s relations with its neighbors and especially with its 
eastern neighbors, German interests appear to be the main issue. A large 
majority (68% to 33%) believe that Germany hopes to create political and 
economic dependence of Central European countries upon Germany. 54% to 
33% feel that it is in Germany’s best interest to "have a strong European Union 
to guarantee the prosperity of the weakest and smallest". The Czech population 
is aware that if Germany appears to be a great supporter of their entry into EU 
or NATO, it is because it is in Germany’s own interests. Indeed, 62% of the 
people interviewed (to 32%) think that "Germany aspires to an economic and 
political hegemony in Europe". This factor is directly related to the question of 
power and the responsibility Germany wields in the Union as well as in whole 
Europe.
59 Klaus, Vaclav, speech delivered for the reception of the Adenauer Price, 21 december 
1993
60 Klaus, Vaclav, "Evropa a My”, [Europe and us] in Lidové Noviny, 18 May 1994, p. 9.
61 As a defender of liberalism and a supporter of the European policy held by England, 




























































































An ambivalence appears when, on the one hand, 53% to 47%, affirm that 
they would prefer Germany not to take more responsibility in the development 
of Europe. On the other hand, 44% to 29%, still consider Germany as the main 
supporter and guarantor of the integration of Central European Countries into 
the European Union and NATO.62 92% believe that an economic rapprochement 
between the two countries would contribute favorably to bilateral relations and 
70% feel that entering the EU and NATO would have the same effect. The 
image of Germany as a motor for European prosperity, stability and security is 
challenged by the image of Germany as a developing worldpower with its own 
ambitions and interests. Furthermore, the power of Germany at the heart of the 
EU and its dominant presence on the European economic scene have played and 
continue to play a double role: as an element of attraction and a model of 
prosperity for an economy in transition, but also as an element of unease for the 
Czech Republic with its political, social and economic independence uncertain 
in a future EU. The weight of Germany in the creation of a single currency and 
the role it tends to play as judge and jury makes Germany in the eyes of the CR 
a moral authority in economic matters.
62 See Gabal.
54% of the people interviewed were in favor of an greater engagement of German 




























































































Ill - GERMAN SUPPORT FOR THE ENLARGEMENT
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was perceived in Germany as a 
step towards the reunification, which is part of BRD’s Fundamental Law. This 
goal remained the main priority for months. Once reunified, Germany again 
occupied the center of the European continent. Until then unambiguous, the 
BRD’s commitment to Western institutions, EEC and NATO, although 
reaffirmed. Germany had to find a compromise between pursuing ■ and 
deepening its engagement in the west (and especially within the EU) and the 
restoration of cooperation with Central Europe which had been interrupted by 
decades of Nazi and communist totalitarism. A refusal to go forward in Central 
Europe would destabilize and even compromise the process of transition in the 
region, while an overactive cooperative policy would be misinterpreted by 
Germany’s Western counterparts. These allies were, in fact, ready to denounce 
the shift of German interests to the east and even to reawaken the myth of a 
Mitteleuropa under German influence.63 At the same time it was recognized that 
Germany, since its reunification and the end of the Cold War, could and indeed 
had to play a more active role in foreign policy.
The question of the role Germany plays in Central Europe is posed in 
terms of the "new responsibility" of a unified Germany because of its 
"objective" potential power and its geopolitical situation.64 Germany has to 
normalize and contain its power to avoid reaching a hegemonic situation. This 
is why it longs for a new role in regional leadership acting as a mediator and 
stabilizer within the framework of the European Union. Since at least 1989 the 
European policy of the German government has been marked by the will to go 
beyond a national policy which might awaken fears among its partners. 
Germany’s European policy legitimizes its activist policy within itself as well as 
with its neighbors, especially to the East, by arguing that it acts not in its own 
interest but in the interest of the EU and for greater stability on the continent. 
This point raises the question of national interest. In fact, European integration 
would be a long-term solution to two leitmotivs of German policy: stability and 
security in Europe.65
63 Starck, Hans, L ’Autre Europe, 34-35, 1996.
64 Lemasson, Sylvie, "L’Allemagne, l'Europe et la question de la Mitteleuropa" in Bafoil, 
François (ed.), Les stratégies allemandes en Europe centrale et orientale, une 
géopolitique des investissements directs, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, 302 p.
65 See for instance Schwarz, Hand-Peter, "Germany’s National and European Interests”, 




























































































The debate on the new stakes of Germany and Europe today could be
termed: "should Europe fear the Germans or not ? 66,1 Reich, an American
political scientist recognizes the structural power of Germany in its capacity to
set agendas and limit the choices of its counterparts. He defines this as a
situation of "hegesy", something like a potential hegemony. Reich then points
out that Germany can not accept a situation of power because of its traumatic
"collective memory". Without entering into the details of an academic
discussion, one regrets the limits of this realist approach which does not place
enough importance on the interdependence which characterize German relations
with the rest of Europe. Numerous non-state or substate actors (the Lander,
private businesses as well as the Bundesbank and the Constitutional Court) are
all independent of the central government and leave the state neither coherent
nor dominant.6 7 68The risk (if any) would then come rather from the weakness of
the state which would no longer be able to manage its citizens or subnational
entities. This analysis leads to the conclusion that German power is beneficial to
other European countries. Western reservation finally would derive from a less
68rather than more active German involvement in Central Europe.
In its relations with its "new" Central Eastern European neighbors, 
unified Germany has from the beginning affirmed its will to turn the page on the 
past and has upheld an active policy to arrive at a resolution of some of the 
differences dating from the Second World War. The case of Poland is in this 
respect clearer but the same holds for Czechoslovakia, even if their relations 
were not normalized as quickly. A clear will to put these troubles to rest before 
beginning enlargement negotiations became apparent at the end of the 
discussions about the Czech-German Declaration of Reconciliation.69 (One 
could evoke many hypotheses as to the reasons for the long delay of 18 months 
before a compromise was reached, but this is not the object of this paper. It can 
only be said that from a strategic point of view, normalization of Czech-German 
relations was not as of much importance to Germany in the beginning of the 
90’s as were relations with Poland or Russia.)
66 See Markovits, Andrei, Reich, Simon, "Should Europe Fear the Germans ?", German 
Politics and Society, n°23, 1991, p.1-20 or the answer to this article from Golberger, 
Bruce N., "Why Europe Should not Fear the Germans", German Politics, Vol.2, n°2, 
August 1993,288-310.
67 Golberger, Bruce, Op. Cit., 1993.
68 See Bulmer, Simon, Paterson, William, "Germany in the European Union: Gentle 
Giant or Emergent Leader ?" International Affairs, vol.72, n°l, January 1996, p. 9-32.
69 On this question, one can quote Chancelier Hemlut Kohl's words during a speech at 
the Bundestag on September 11th 1996, when he asserted that the Declaration had to be 




























































































Political scientists and German foreign policy analysts stress the fact that 
the German government tends to structure its internal as well as external politics 
using the European integration framework. More than just an argument, Europe 
appears as a real ideology, illustrated by the title of Timothy Garton Ash’s book 
on Germany "In Europe's name". Over the last forty years, the FRG’s European 
policy has been subject to constraints : its geopolitical situation and Germany’s 
reliance upon Western allies where even Brandt’s Ostpolitik depended on the 
consent of the superpowers. In this context European integration was seen as a 
way of reducing the diplomatic disadvantages of a semi-sovereign West- 
Germany. The "Europeanization" of Germany may therefore be seen as both an 
objective and an achievement of Bonn’s European policy.70
A clear illustration of this German European policy can be seen in the 
CDU-CSU's document the "Lamers-Schauble report" which was made public in 
September 1994. Devoted to the future evolution of the European Union, it 
sheds an interesting light on German foreign policy priorities. Among other 
things, it exposes the reasoning which led Germany to support the integration of 
Central European countries into the EU : "It is o f particular interest to Germany 
that Europe not be exposed to centrifugal forces... It would be the first to suffer 
directly from the consequences o f instability in the East. The only solution to 
prevent the return o f the unstable pre-war situation which confined Germany in 
an uncomfortable position between East and West, is to integrate German 
Central and Eastern European neighbors in the post-war West European 
system. "7I
The stakes of enlargement for Germany are multiple and the 
"consequences o f the instability" appear in several arguments in favor of the 
EU's enlargement.72
The geographic position of Germany means it that its eastern border 
corresponds with that of the EU (as does Austria's since its integration in 1995). 
It is the border between the stability and internal prosperity of the EU and the 
economic difficulties and potential instability in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The migratory pressure on German borders is very high and generally comes 
from countries located further to the east, such as the former Soviet Union or 
Romania. The fear of an influx of economic immigrants and the consequences
70 Bulmer, Simon, Paterson, William, op. cit.
71 CDU-CSU Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, Uberlegungen zur europaischen 
Politik, (Lamers-Schauble Bericht), 1. September 1994, 14 p.
72 See for instance Jopp, Matthias, "Germany and EU Enlargement", in Kaiser, Kalr, 
BrUning, Martin (ed.), East-Central Europe and the EU: Problems o f Integration, Bonn, 




























































































of the ensuing political instability is seriously discussed in Germany73. The 
CDU-CSU report recalls that "if European integration does not evolve towards 
enlargement, Germany could, under security constraints, be forced or incited to 
reestablish stability in Eastern Europe alone and by traditional means, which 
would be beyond its strength and would bring about the erosion o f cohesion 
within the European Union. "74 75
Even if economic motives are of secondary importance, the financial 
question can not be neglected, especially as budgetary constraints within the EU 
have become a negotiating point. While Germany would like to see a reduction 
of its share in the common budget, the question of financing enlargement is 
more than ever the order of the day. Candidate countries will be, at least during 
a first period, net beneficiaries of the EU (unlike in the previous enlargement). 
Germany alone can not support the cost of the transition (the case of East 
Germany has shown the massive transfer of economic means needed for such a 
reequilibration).
One of the main objectives of the enlargement is to insure that Germany 
is surrounded by "order and stability". It will once again find a centrality - 
Mittellage - with reveal positive aspects in this new context and break with 150 
years of German hesitations "between Western and Russian overtures; between 
"Locarno" and Rappallo","15 In a sense, this Mittellage will contribute to 
recreate a natural order in a Europe conceived as a culturally and homogenous 
socio-economic entity which covers the entire continent and which the Iron 
curtain had but temporarily divided.76
A key actor and active supporter of enlargement, Germany is an 
important element in the future evolution of the EU, inasmuch as this
73 On a concrete level, this means the signature of some bilateral agreements between 
Germany and its central-european neighbors. For instance, Germany signed in 1994 with 
the CR and with Poland two treaties, according to which these States promise under 
certain circumstances to take back the illegal emigrants who had been arrested in 
Germany, whatever their nationality, as soon as they enter Germany from these two 
countries (in the Czech case, this agreement comes along with a financial aid from 
Germany of 60 million DM).
This policy, to which is added other bilateral agreements (on foreign workers in Bavaria 
for instance) contributes to transform step by step the Czech-German border into a 
internal E li’s border.
74 CDU-CSU Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, Überlegungen zur europaischen 
Politik, (Lamers-SchSuble Bericht), 1. September 1994,14 p.
75 Deubner, Christian, "L'Europe idéale de l'Allemagne", Revue d'Etudes Comparatives 
Est-Ouest, 1996,4, p. 202.




























































































A key actor and active supporter of enlargement, Germany is an important 
element in the future evolution of the EU, inasmuch as this enlargement will 
move the center of the Union toward the east. The new members about to join 
are traditionally part of the "German sphere of influence", whether this be an 
economic and political reality or merely the perception of other member states 
today.77 A united Germany is also aware of the fears of its western European 
partners about its political or economic involvement in Central Europe. This is 
one reason it sees its foreign policy interests best served if it operates within a 
multilateral and integrated policy context.78 To evoke today the renewed power 
of Germany or its relations with the CEEC no longer makes any sense in a 
bilateral framework. The prospect of the integration of the Czech Republic, as 
well as the transformation of the European scene in recent years, requires a 
multilateral perspective.
77 The institutional balance between the small and the larger states has become an 
important issue of the institutional debate within the Eu before the enlargement. The last 
enlargement of the EU is in this perspective an interesting stage. The three new 
members are among the "small states" of the EU and are considered as belonging to the 
"German sphere", in the sense of the global interests and as opposed to the French 
"sphere of influence" traditionnally associated to the so called southern countries. 
Although the public opinion is sometimes undecided (see Austria), the new members 
declare themselves in favour of a rapid enlargement of the UE. Baltic States for Sweden 
and Finland, Central Europe in the Austrian case count among the priorities. Despite the 
financial costs of such an enlargement, to which these countries are net contributors, 
they are today among its most ardent supporters after Germany.




























































































IV- A MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVE : GERMANY IN A BROADER 
EUROPE
It is not the purpose of this paper to focus on Central European debates 
concerning whether Germany belongs to Central Europe or not. Nevertheless 
this debate has consequences on the perceptions of the role Germany plays in 
the region : if one considers that Germany is part of Central Europe then one 
could justify that Germany differentiates itself from other member-states in its 
relations with the rest of Central Europe.79
The Czech Republic and Central Europe on their Way to European Union, 
Alone or Together?
When in 1989 the Western European position was to suggest to the CEEC to 
make it their common goal to succeed in their transition and join the West, the 
three Central European Countries concerned, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, clearly expressed their ambition to go at it alone, each down their 
proper road (so-called differentiation competition). The short term objective 
was to integrate the western European institutions and thereby recover their 
position on the European political scene. The European Union was perceived as 
the ultimate goal.
The Czech policy of the "return to Europe" was at least in the first years 
marked by this determination to differentiate itself from its Central European 
neighbors. To go faster and not wait for ones who had difficulties, to be 
considered the first pupil in the class by western eyes justified a specific 
policies for the transition.
For instance, in the debates held before the division of Czechoslovakia, 
one of the arguments for separation which was supposed to positively influence 
the Czech people (who were not in fact in favor of the separation of the two 
republics) was that it would speed integration into the EU : abandon the East to 
join the West, move the country’s center of gravity to bring the Czech Republic 
closer to the center of Europe and to the EU. Economic arguments which were 
ostensibly more objective were then quoted to prove such allegations.
This policy of everyman for himself risked reinforcing not only existing 
centrifugal tendencies but also strategies of "clientelism” towards the western 
countries which were supposed to help the integration : Germany and Austria
79 See Schulze-Wessel, Martin, "Die Mitte liegt westwarts, Mitteleuropa in 




























































































for Hungary, and Germany and Great-Britain for the Czech Republic, for 
80instance.
The publication of the Lamers-Schauble report at the end of the summer 
1994 is a factor - one of the most visible - which allowed Czech policy to 
evolve vis-à-vis its Central European neighbors, especially Poland, in the 
direction of a rapprochement. It is recognized and officially accepted in Prague 
that Poland, for Germany as well as for the rest of Europe, has a strategic role 
and position because of its size, its geographic position between the EU and 
Russia and its recent history (especially for Germany where some suggest that 
Poland evokes a feeling of culpability that conditions relations between the two 
countries). Even though the Czech economic transition is presented by the 
Czech government as being more advanced than that of Poland, the strategic 
issue and especially the security issue gives Poland a privileged position in the 
enlargement debate. After few years of 'competition', cooperation between the 
two states has been recognized as being an advantage for both. One can note a 
change in the Czech political discourse toward Poland in 1994 which provoked, 
among other things, renewed contact at the political level.
This rapprochement is not associated with any organization or institution 
for Central European cooperation. Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic 
has always, for instance, strongly resisted the Triangle of Visegrad, which it 
considered a western invention ; a consolation prize or a waiting room for the 
CEEC on the road to EU : "We managed to resist the recommendations o f some 
of our western friends to create in Central and Eastern Europe a special 
subregional institution because it would separate us from Europe instead of 
leading us to it." 81 Visegrad is seen as a institution imposed from outside, 
sometimes even compared with the Comecon, imposed by Moscow. Moreover, 
since the signature of the Association Agreements, Visegrad is no longer seen 
as worthwhile. This lukewarm attempt at interregional organization and the lack 
of a policy of cooperation within Central Europe shows that the Czechs chose to 
privilege their east-west relations, seen as more "useful" on the way towards the 
EU.80 12
80 de La Serre, Françoise, Lequesne, Christian, Rupnik, Jacques, L'Union Européenne: 
ouverture à l'Est ?, PUF, Politique d’aujourdhui, Paris, 1994, p. 120.
81 Klaus, Vaclav, "Evropy a My", Lidové Noviny, 13-05-1994.
82 The signature in December 1992 of the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA) nevertheless marks the succès of economic cooperation in the region, even if 




























































































The development of German policy toward Eastern Europe moves in the same 
direction. Since 1989 Germany has privileged the re-establishment of bilateral 
relations with its eastern neighbors but each in parallel, that is, without 
introducing any official differentiation between them and according to the global 
policy evoked earlier. This has resulted in, among other things, the signature of 
good neighborhood and friendship treaties in 1991-92 which were coached in the 
same terms both Czechoslovakia and Poland, and then with the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia.
Nevertheless some general tendencies at the European level lead to doubts 
as to whether the Czech Republic is going to find in integration what it is 
longing for. For instance the creation of the Weimar triangle in 1994, where 
Germany, Poland and France met together, could be seen as an important or at 
least a highly symbolic stage of the recomposition of the European continent. 
Even if it is only a forum for discussion, the simple fact of its existence confirms 
the will of these three countries to think together about the future of Europe. This 
developement is important for the Czech Republic. The meetings of the Weimar 
Triangle were not especially followed by Czech public opinion, but the Weimar 
Triangle reaffirms the dichotomy large /small nations in Europe and extends it to 
Central Europe.83 This is why its creation must be considered a new step in the 
transformation of Europe, related to the debate on the evolution of the EU in the 
perspective of the future enlargement. By including France in the process of 
cooperation in the region, this initiative not only gains a measure of transparency 
but also helps building confidence vis-à-vis the two most relevant countries in 
the "enlargement game".84
The Weimar Triangle rather than the Visegrad Triangle ?
13 This echoes the argument, which is often quoted on the Czech as well as the 
Slovenian political scene, according to which the integration into the UE is an 
opportunity for the small central-European countries to get a voice on the European and 
international level.





























































































Even though the debate on the nature and shape of post-enlargement European 
Union will not be addressed here, some reflections on the subject would be 
appropriate. The integration of some Central European countries will obviously 
contribute to alter the balance within the European Union. Whether a shift in the 
EU’s center of gravity towards the East, a shift of Germany towards the new 
center of the EU or a redistribution of power and centers of interest in Europe, 
this enlargement will transform the European Union the most.
In 1989, with the euphoria of the "return to Europe" which at last 
appeared possible and even inevitable, support of German reunification was 
seen more than ever as the last step to the unification of all Europe, with 
Germany as the main and inescapable partner of the Czech Republic. Only a 
few years later, this perception has evolved. In reaction to a Germany which has 
become a European and Central European power, the Czech Republic considers 
integration into the EU and NATO as a means of finding a necessary 
counterbalance. There appears to be a paradox in the relations of the Czech 
Republic with the European Union, which can be summed up in this way: even 
as the Czech Republic hopes to find a means to counterbalance Germany’s 
power, in integration into the European Union especially its economic power, 
and to transform bilateral relations into multilateral relations, it dreads that the 
EU could become in effect a "German Europe".
There exists today a direct link between the German question and the 
future configuration of Central Europe and of Europe as a whole. For many 
years, one of the main dilemmas of German foreign policy had been to find a 
compromise between Ostpolitik, that is, the rapprochement with East Germany 
as a means to open up the East, and Europapolitik, the allegiance to the 
European Community and more generally to the West. Now, for the first time 
since the war, there is a chance to reconcile the two. This is also the wish of 
Germany’s Eastern neighbors.85
Concerning the Czech Republic more specifically, integration into EU is 
not only a "return to Europe" or a confirmation that this country belongs to 
Western values. It is a process of distancing itself from its past. Being able to 
integrate the EU means being able to envision a different and more open future 
in a multilateral framework, after having pulled a veil over a complex past. In
85 Rupnik, Jacques, "East-Central Europe: the Pivotal Role of Germany", Lecture at the 





























































































this regard, Czech relations with Germany are revealing and illustrative of a 
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